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THE JUVENILE AND THE COURT:
A CONTINUING DIALOGUE
JAMES P. WHITE*
The juvenile court is conspicuously a response to the
modern spirit of social justice. It is perhaps the first legal
tribunal where laws and science - work side by side.
It recognizes the fact that law unaided is incompetent to
decide what is adequate treatment of delinquency and crime.
It undertakes to define and readjust social situations with-
out the sentiment of prejudice. Its approach to the problem
which the child presents is scientific, objective and dispas-
sionate. The methods which it uses are those of social case
work, in which every child is studied and treated as an
individual.'
A series of recent judicial decisions involving juveniles culmin-
ating in the case of In re Gault 2 and corresponding abundance
of law review articles has caused a new appraisal of the opera-
tion of juvenile courts in the United States. These cases and articles
create the need for a current assessment of the basic operation
of the Juvenile Court in North Dakota.
In the development of English law children over the age of
fourteen were traditionally treated as adults with regard to the
operation of the criminal laws. Children between the ages of seven
and fourteen were treated as though they might be capable of a
crime and subject to adult penalties, but children under the age
of seven were considered to be legally incapable of forming the
* Professor of Law, Indiana University. B. A. 1953, J. D. 1956, University of Iowa,
L.L.M. 1959, George Washington University.
1. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1927).
2. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. See: Evans, Constitutional Rights of Juveniles--or Parens Patriae v. Due Process,
4 WILLAMErTE L.J. 152 (1966) ; Paulson, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts and the Poor
Man, 54 CALY. L. REV. 694 (1966); Lefstein, In re Gault, Juvenile Courts and Lawyers,
53 A.B.A.J. 811 (1967); Whitlatch, Juvenile Court-A Court of Law, 18 W. REs. L. REV.
1239 (1967); Lemert, Legislating Change in the Juvenile Court, 1967 Wise. L. REV. 421
(1967); Robitscher, The California Juvenile Court; A Bill of Rights for Youth, 52
WOMEN L.J. 146 (1966).
See also Second Tentative Draft, Uniform Juvenile Court Act, National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and KETCHAM AND PAULSEN, JUVENILE COURTS,
CASES AND MATumAna (1967).
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necessary intent to commit a crime and hence could not be found
guilty of a crime. Upon a finding of guilt, the punishment pre-
scribed was the same as that for adult offenders. This English
system was transplanted to the United States and existed in this
form in all American jurisdictions until 1899.4
In 1899 the first in a new system of courts forthe treatment
of juvenile offenders was established. The first juvenile court was
established by the State of Illinois, 5 but was soon followed by
like courts in other jurisdictions so that juvenile courts currently
are operative in all of the fifty states. The intent of the new
court was one of rehabilitation rather than one of punishment.
The normal formal court proceedings were to a great degree
eliminated and the concept began of an informal proceeding where
the juvenile and the judge could discuss the problems of the
juvenile and reach a solution with the intent of rehabilitating or
saving the juvenile from future acts of delinquency. The basic
conceptions which traditionally have distinguished juvenile courts
from other courts can be briefly stated.
Children are to be dealt with separately from adults. Their
cases are to be heard at a different time and, preferably,
in a different place; they are to be detained in separate
buildings, and, if institutional guidance is necessary, they
are to be committed to institutions for children. Through
its probation officers the court can keep in constant touch
with the children who have appeared before it. Taking
children from their parents is, when possible, to be avoided;
on the other hand, parental obligations are to be enforced.
The procedure of the court must be as informal as pos-
sible. Its purpose is not to punish but to save. It is to
deal with children not as criminals but as persons in whose
guidance and welfare the State is peculiarly interested.
Save in the cases of adults, its jurisdiction is equitable, not
criminal, in nature . . ..
Formal criminal court procedures including indictment, formal
prosecution, guaranteed representation by legal counsel and trial
by jury were not provided, but rather the proceeding became
4. See National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Guidea for Juvenile Court Judges
(1967). For a discussion of the historical background of Juvenile courts see Mack, The
Juvenile Court, 23 HAnv. L. REv. 104 (1909).
5. Illinois Laws 1899, at 131.
6. PxzxnH AND OPPENHEimm, THE LEGAL AsPECT OF THE JUVENILE COURT, at 9
(Children's Bureau Pub. No. 99, 1922). See also Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L.
Ra. 104, 119, 120 (1909) wherein the author states: "The problem for determination by
the Judge is not, has this boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but what is he, how
has he become what he Is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest
of the state to save him from a downward career."
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one in the nature of a dialogue between the judge and the child."
The courts were considered civil rather than criminal8 and the
child appearing before the court became a ward of the state rather
than a prisoner of the state.9
No doubt the procedures by which law is 'enforced' injuvenile court must condition the law itself, particularly if
law is viewed as but a reflection of what officials in fact
do. The officials of the juvenile court are free to use law
in ways unavailable to other tribunals. For them, law is
not merely a code of conduct that children must be made
to obey; it is a code whose violation is taken as sympto-
matic of an interior disorder and used to identify those
children to be taken into custody and 'helped'. The discov-
ery of a violation represents an opportunity to teach new
lessons.
Thus the underlying philosophy of the juvenile court system
since its establishment in the United States has been that of the
court's operating in a parens pctriae relationship to the juvenile
offender." The prime purpose or intent of the juvenile court has
been that of rehabilitation. Under this philosophy and purpose, the
''non-criminal" nature of juvenile proceedings has been considered
adequate to render normal safeguards of due process inapplicable
to those cases coming before the juvenile court. Thus traditionally
the operation of the juvenile court process has been characterized
by an ignoring of the safeguards usually considered fundamental
in a criminal court proceeding. 12
For many years, and particularly in recent years there have
been questions of re-examination raised regarding the operation of
juvenile courts under the parens patriae concept."8 The inherent
7. See Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Ju8-
tire, 79 ELAnv. L. Rzv. 775 (1966) and Caldwell, The Juvenile Court: Its Development and
Some Major Problems, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 493 (1961). See also Ketcham. The Unftul-
filled Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIME AND DEItNQUENCY 97 (1961).
8. In re Holmes 379 Pa. 599, 603, 109 A.2d 523, 525 (1954) In which the court stated:
"The proceedings in such a court are not in the nature of a criminal trial, but constitute
merely a civil inquiry or action looking to the treatment, reformation and rehabilitation
of the minor child. There purpose is not penal, but protective .... "
9. People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932). The court, however, has been
considered as being "not a social agency, but a court of law." McCabe, A Big Brother in
Family Court, 16 Juv. CT. Ju GEs JR. 116 (1966).
10. Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts and Individualized Justice,
79 HARv. L. REv. 775, 804 (1966).
11. See Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the American Juvenile Court, JUSTICE FOR
TE CHILD at 23 (1962). See also BLOCK AND FLYNN, DELINQUENCY: THE JuvzNrL OF-
FENDER IN AMERICA TODAY (1956) at 305-87.
12. In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954) (no right to confront witnesses)
People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App.2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953) (no double Jeopardy de-
fense available) In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App.2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (1952) (no right to
release on ball) Christensen v. Christensen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760 (1951) (no right
to sworn testimony).
13. "The prerogative of the state, arising out of its power and duty, as parens patriae,
to protect the interest of infants, has always been exercised by courts of chancery." iUnd-
say v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 326, 100 N.E. 892, 894 (1918).
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supposition that juvenile courts were non-criminal has been at-
tacked on the ground that if juveniles are deprived of their liberty,
the proceedings are essentially criminal. 1 4 The juvenile court sys-
tem has also been attacked for its assumption that juvenile justice
adequately performs its rehabilitation function.1 5  A number of
states have begun certain reforms in juvenile court procedure, re-
garding procedural rights of juveniles appearing before it. These
reform swithin the individual states have not applied all elements
of criminal due process to juvenile court proceedings, but have
provided some new protections for the juvenile which presage re-
cent judicial rulings.18
One of the amazing paradoxisms of the American judicial sys-
tem is that prior to In re Gault,17 the United States Supreme
Court in the past several decades had heard only three cases in-
volving offenses committed by juveniles. 18 The most recent case
prior to In re Gault was Kent v. United States'9 in which the
main issue was the question of waiver by the juvenile court in
the District of Columbia of its exclusive jurisdiction in the case
of a sixteen year old accused of rape. In this case the court
discussed at length a number of issues relevant to the operation
of juvenile court concepts. The court stated: "There is no place
in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous
consequences without ceremony . . . without hearing, without ef-
fective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons. ' 2 0
In Kent, it was held that before a case could be transferred by a
14. See Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL .Q. 387 (1961).
See also Quick, Constitutional Rights fn the Juvenile Court, 12 H1ARv. L.J. 76 (1966).
15. "There is so much evidence that some juvenile courts . . . lack the personnel, fa-
cilities and techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the State in a parens
patriae capacity, at least with respect to children charged with law violation. There is
evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst
of both worlds; he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children." Kent v. United States, 883 U.S. 541,
555 (1966).
"Studies conducted by the Commission, legislative inquiries in various States, and
reports by informed observers compel the conclusion that the great hopes originally held
for the juvenile court have not been fulfilled. It had not succeeded significantly in re-
habilitating delinquent youth, in reducing or even stemming the tide of delinquency, or in
bringing Justice and compassion to the child offender." PREsmENT's CoMM'IN ON LAw EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMIIsTRATION OF JUsTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIEY
80 (1967). A Juvenile court Judge has observed:
"For the unhappy Judge who can expect virtually no help in determining the basic
pattern of the child's behavior because of his court's lack of a trained staff, for the un-
fortunate Jurist who knows that his state training school represents naked detention and
nothing better, even perhaps something worse, there can be but one governing principle:
to resolve every uncertainty in favor of the child and his home; to commit solely on the
basis of unmistakable need for community protection." Dill, When Should a Child be Com-
mitted?, 4 NAT. PROBATION AND PAROL A. JR. 1, 5-6 (1958).
16. See Reiderer, The Role of Counsel iOn the Juvenile Court, 2 J. FAM. L. 16 (1962);
Comment, Juvenile Justice in Transition, U.C.L.A. L. , v. 1144 (1967).
17. 887 U.S. 1 (1967).
18. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) ; Gallegos v. United States, 370 U.S. 49
(1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S 596 (1948).
19. $88 U.S. 541 (1966).
20. Kent, supra, note 18 at 554.
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juvenile court to another court for criminal prosecution, a hearing
must be held and counsel for the child must be given the right
to examine, and an opportunity to refute, any information given
to the judge. It was also held that the judge must render a state-
ment of the reasons for the transfer so that his decision might
be subject to review. This was held to be required in view of
the "critically important" decision that transfer entails, the court
stating that " . . . there is no place in our system of law for
for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without
ceremony, without hearing, without a statement of reasons." The
court held that the assistance of counsel in the "critically important
determination of waiver of jurisdiction by a juvenile court is es-
sential to the proper administration of justice."
The prime case of In the Matter of Gault has caused great
attention to juvenile courts and their proceedings in each of the
states. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a
writ of habeus corpus by an Arizona Superior Court finding that
Gault had been accorded treatment consistent With constitutional
due process.
The "due process" Gault had been accorded was the following:
(1) he was taken into custody as the result of a verbal
complaint by a woman neighbor about a lewd telephone call;
(2) without notice to his parents he was taken to a detention
home;
(3) after learning from neighbors where he was, his mother
went there, and was orally informed why he was there and that
a juvenile court hearing would be held the next day;
(4) the hearing was based upon a petition filed by a pro-
bation officer, which merely alleged that Gault was a delinquent
under 18 and prayed for an order regarding his care and custody;
(5) no attorney was present at the hearing, the complaintant
was absent, no one was sworn and no transcript or record of the
hearing was made;
(6) at the hearing Gault made an admission or confession of
some kind;
(7) at a subsequent hearing, again without an attorney pres-
ent, Gault made admissions or a confession of some kind;
(8) at this hearing a "referral report" was made and filed
with the court, but its contents were not disclosed to Gault or his
parents; and
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(9) Gault was committed as a juvenile delinquent to the
State Industrial School for 6 years for an act which if committed
by an adult would have carried a maximum sentence of 2 months.
This is not the "due process" that normally comes to the mind
of a lawyer or a judge.
In the appellants brief in the Gault case, counsel differentiated
between criminal law process prior to trial and the process at
the trial stage.
White, Hamilton and Miranda related not to the trial stage,
but to stages in the criminal process prior to trial. By con-
trast, the issue in the case at bar is whether due process
requires the assistance of counsel at the trial itself, a stage
of the juvenile process, needless to say, which is not merely
"critical", but its very essence. It is the central fact-find-
ing inquiry where the determination is made whether the
accused juvenile committed the acts charged. The resolu-
tion of this inquiry determines whether the juvenile will be
denominated a juvenile delinquent and possibly deprived of
his liberty.21
In reversing this decision the United States Supreme Court set
forth these due process requirements for juvenile proceedings:
(1) The child and his parents must be notified in writing of
the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at the
delinquency hearing and the specific issues they will be called
upon to meet.
(2) The child and his parents must be notified of the child's
right to counsel, whether retained by them or appointed by the
court.
(3) The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is ap-
plicable to juveniles as well as to adults.
(4) In the absence of a valid confession (one not a product
of ignorance of rights, fright, despair or fantasy), confrontation
and sworn testimony by witnesses available for cross-examination
is required.
In addition the Court expressly did not rule on Arizona's fail-
ure to provide a transcript of record of the proceedings nor its
failure to allow for review of such procedures, reversing instead
in light of the requirements for counsel and due process.
In light of the flurry of publicity regarding juvenile courts and
their operation and the resulting plethora of law review articles
21. In re Gault, Appellants brief at 15.
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examining problems facing juvenile courts it is useful to look at
the North Dakota Juvenile Court and its operation.
The Juvenile Court was established in North Dakota in 191122
and is the District Court acting as the juvenile court.23 North
Dakota is particularly fortunate that the juvenile court is part of
the general integrated court system of the state and that it is
a division of the highest court of trial jurisdiction, the district court.
This is in accordance with the United States Children's Bureau
standards for juvenile courts.24 Thus the juvenile court is an in-
tegral part of the court system of the state. The judges sitting
on juvenile cases are experienced and highly qualified full-time
state judges and not part-time judges of special courts assigned
to deal with juvenile problems. It cannot be emphasized too
strongly that part of the key to success of a juvenile court is to
have the highest level trial court of the state operate as the ju-
venile court.
In North Dakota the juvenile court is given fairly typical
juvenile court jurisdictional authority. It has original jurisdiction
in all proceedings:
1. Concerning any child residing in or who is temporarily
within the county:
a. Who has violated any city or village ordinance
or law of this state or of the United States;
b. Who has deserted his h o m e without sufficient
cause or who is habitually disobedient to the rea-
sonable and lawful commands of his parents,
guardians, or other custodians;
c. Who habitually associates with dissolute, vicious,
or immoral persons, or who is leading an immoral
or vicious life;
d. Who, being required by law to attend school, will-
fully and habitually absents himself therefrom, or
who habitually violates the rules and regulations
thereof;
e. Whose parent or other person legally respon-
sible for the care and maintenance of such child,
neglects or refuses, when able to do so, to provide
proper or necessary support, education as required
by law, medical, surgical, or other care necessary
for his health, morals, or well-being, or who is
abandoned by his parents, guardian, or other cus-
22. N.D. Szs. LAws 1911, Chap. 177.
23. N.D. Cm"iT. Cons § 27-16-01 (1960).
24. STANDARDS FOR JUVENLE AND FAMILY COURTS (Children's Bureau Pub. NO. 437,
1966).
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todian, or who is otherwise without proper custody
or guardianship;
f. Whose home, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunk-
enness, or depravity on the part of the parent or
person having the custody or control of such child,
is an unfit place for such child to live;
g. Who engages in an occupation or who is in a sit-
uation dangerous or injurious to the health, safety,
or morals of himself or others;
2. Concerning any person who is twenty-one years of age
residing within the county charged with having violated
any city or village ordinance or law of this state or of
the United States prior to having become eighteen years
of age;
3. Concurrent jurisdiction with the district court, county
court with increased jurisdiction, and justice or police
magistrate court, over any person between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-one years residing within the county
charged with having violated any city or village ordi-
nance or any law of this state or of the United States;
4. Concurrent jurisdiction for the care or commitment to
the state school at Grafton or other public facility for
the mentally deficient or mentally disordered child as
provided by section 25-04-06.25
One of the jurisdictional problems now facing juvenile courts
is that of the optimum maximum age for a youthful offender
over whom it assumes jurisdiction. 2
It has been suggested that the jurisdiction of juvenile courts
should be enlarged and extended beyond minority to 22 or 23 years
of age.27 Social and emotional maturity are not achieved at any
given chronological age. There will be some youngsters who, be-
cause of their personality maladjustment, cannot profit from pro-
grams designed for adolescents. On the other hand, there will
be adolescents who need placement in a program for juveniles
rather than in a youthful-offender program.2 8
Consideration should be given whether the juvenile courts should
have its jurisdiction (concerning the age of the youthful offender)
enlarged. In making this ultimate determination consideration
must be given to the availability of specialists and specialized
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-08 (Supp. 5. 1967).
26. The usual age for Juvenile court Jurisdiction is 18 years of age with an extension
to 21 years of age for a minor who has committed acts of delinquency or is unman-
ageable prior to reaching 21 years of age. Many states, however, limit the age to under
16 although there appears to be a trend in recent years to increase it to 21.
27. Sheridan, New Directions fr the Juvenile Court, 31 FlD. POB. 15 (June 1967).
28. 14. at 19.
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services which will assist the judge in determining the social and
emotional maturity of the youthful offender.
In North Dakota the District Court Judges are entitled to ap-
point not more than two suitable and discreet persons of good
moral character as juvenile commissioners for each county of the
district. 29 These Commissioners may:
1. Administer oaths;
2. Take acknowledgments of instruments, for the purposes
of this chapter;
3. Receive complaints and have warrants issued within the
the provisions of this chapter;
5. Issue summonses and subpoenas for hearings within the
provisions of this chapter. Such hearings may be held at
any place within the county where the proceeding is com-
menced;
6. Compel the attendance of witnesses before him and report
any witness or witnesses to one of the judges of the
judicial district for nonattendance or refusal to be sworn
or to testify as provided by section 27-10-23; and
7. Make such temporary order for the custody and control
of a child as he may deem proper.30
Under the North Dakota statute it is apparent that the actual
authority of the juvenile commissioner depends in part on that
authority given him by the District Court Judge. If indeed the
juvenile commissioner initiates the intake process he operates the
screening process regarding the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
in juvenile matters. It is a type of review or assessment of infor-
mation regarding the alleged acts or activities of juveniles."1 The
juvenile commissioner collects information for use by the court.
The North Dakota Courts over thirty years ago specified some
of the constitutional safeguards which must be afforded to an in-
dividual. In Ex Parte Solberg,3 2 the court stated that "[t]he
statute clearly contemplates notice to the parents and a reason-
able opportunity to be heard before the court may make an order
depriving them, perhaps permanently, of their children."83 In light
of Gault, the right to notice clearly applies to any hearing at
any time within the juvenile court procedure and applies whether
29. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-02 (1960).
30. Id.
31. For an excellent discussion of the intake process, see Sheridan, Juvenile 0ourt
Intake, 2 J. FA. L. 139 (1962).
32. Ex Parte Solberg, 52 N.D. 518, 203 N.W. 898 (1925).
38. Id. at 524, 203 N.W. at 900.
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the hearing is conducted by the juvenile court commissioner or the
district judge.
The North Dakota Century Code contains two principal sections
regarding the juvenile hearing itself.34 Section 27-16-1435 provides
that notice be given of any hearing involving a child. North Da-
kota statutory law expresses rights of notice like those rights of
notice deemed necessary by the court in the Gault decision. This
section provides for notice in writing "citing briefly the substance
of the petition" and requiring that this notice be served upon
both the child and the parents. The North Dakota case of Ex
Parte Solberg5 requires that this notice of hearing be served on
both parents of the child. The North Dakota courts have stated
that if the proceeding is a hearing to permanently terminate
parental rights, there must be proper notice served upon the child
and the parents.87
The Gault decision indicates that a general allegation of de-
linquency is no longer sufficient. The court indicates that the
notice must "set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity."
North Dakota statutes seem to embody this thought in their ex-
pression that the substance of the petition must be cited. How-
ever, the question might be raised whether in the past there has
been substantial compliance with this provision or whether there
has simply been a notice containing a general allegation of de-
34. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-14 (1960): "After a petition shall have been filed and
after such further investigation as the court ray direct, unless the parties hereafter
named shall appear voluntarily, the court or juvenile commissioner shall issue a summons
reciting briefly the substance of the petition and requiring the person or persons who
have custody or control of the child to appear personally and bring the child before the
court at a time and place stated. If the person so summoned shal be other than the
parent or guardian of the child, then the parent or guardian, or both, also shall be noti-
fied of the pendency of the case and of the time and place appointed, by personal service
before the hearing, except as otherwise provided in this chapter. A summons may be
issued requiring the appearance of any other person whose presence, in the opinion of
the judge, Is necessary. If It appears that it is for the best interests and the welfare of
the child, the judge or the juvenile commissioner may endorse an order upon said sum-
mons directing the officer serving the same to take the child from his parents, guardian,
or custodian and to place him as directed in such order to await the return time of the
summons. Or if the Judge or juvenile commissioner, upon showing made, is convinced that
such summons will be ineffectual to procure the attendance of a child, he may require
the petitioner or other interested person to make and file an affidavit setting forth the
reasons therefor. Upon filing such affidavit with the clerk of the court, such clerk shall
issue a warrant directing the sheriff or other peace officer to arrest the child and bring
him before the court forthwith or to hold him in such place as the warrant-may direct
to await time of hearing." N.D. CzNT. CODE § 27-16-18 (Supp. 5, 1967): "On any hearing
within the provisions of this chapter, the court may receive the report of the juvenile
commissioner, made orally or in writing, of testimony taken before him. Such report
may be received in evidence and be considered by the court with such other evidence as
may be presented at the hearing. If the testimony taken by the juvenile commissioner has
been taken under oath by a competent reporter it shall be unnecessary to have such
testimony given by the same witness at such hearing. The court may conduct the hearing
in an informal manner. Such hearing shall be reported as in a civil case. The general
public shall be excluded . . . and only such persons admitted as have a direct interest
in the case. The court shall hear and determine all cases without a jury."
35. N.D. CaNT. CODE § 27-16-14 (1960).
36. 52 N.D. 618, 208 N.W. 898 (1926).
37. In re Kennedy, 110 N.W.2d (N.D. 1961).
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linquency. Whatever the past practice has been, the future prac-
tice has been suggested and in any judicial proceeding (but not
prejudicial) regarding a child appearing before a juvenile court,
proper notice must be given to all parties stating in substance
the alleged misconduct.
The hearing itself and its procedures has in North Dakota
embodied the parens patriae concept. The concept of the court
has been expressed in a 1960 study of juvenile delinquency in North
Dakota which states:
Juvenile courts are in a position to be aware of the
many problems of youth who come into conflict with stand-
ards set down by our society through its laws. It has been
a part of the juvenile court movement that determination
in behalf of the child should be the result of an appraisal
of the circumstances which are related to child behavior as
well as to the act. The child may, of course, have legal
counsel and he and his parents should know this. Such rep-
resentation, however, is not ordinarily considered essential
as the court itself represent the child and his welfare in
taking action deemed to be in the child's best interest.
The hearing should be informal and conducted in private.
He should be placed preferably in the custody of his own
home or when necessary in a shelter or foster home.8
The Juvenile Court hearing regarding an alleged act by a
minor child must in light of the Gault decision additionally pro-
vide that:
1) Notice of right to counsel must be given the child and his
parents. If they are unable to afford counsel, the court must be
willing to appoint counsel. However, if the parent and the child
wish to waive their right to counsel, they may so waive counsel.
2) The privilege against self-incrimination exists and the child
must be informed of his right to remain silent.
3) That any confession must be validly made and freely given
and if such confession is not in existence then the juvenile is
entitled to confront all witnesses and to hear their sworn testi-
mony and to cross-examine them or their testimony. 9
38. Hoadly and Gardebring, IMPERILED YOUTH: A STUDY or JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN
15 RURAL COUNTIES IN NORTH DAKOTA (Public Welfare Board of North Dakota (1960).
39. See Driscoll, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Juvenile Court Pro-
ceedings. 15 Juv. CT. JuDGEs J. 17 (Fall 1964). A new look at juvenile courts ,and con-
stitutional guarantees afforded in them came after the deosion in 1966 of the case of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 1966. In this case the United States Supreme Court
held that it would not admit as evidence a confession given by a person suspected of a
crime unless it was affirmatively shown that the suspect freely gave his confession after
being appraised of certain constitutional guarantees by the law enforcement officials.
The court stressed that when the nature of the investigation changes from investigatory
to accusatory that the suspect must be made fully aware of his constitutional rights;
that he has the right to remain silent; that he has the right to request that adequate
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The North Dakota Juvenile Courts possess the necessary
mechanisms to comply with these requirements of the Gault case.
While various questions, implications and extensions exist as a re-
sult of the Supreme Court's decision in the Gault case 4 0 the basic
requirements seem quite clear.
The hearing itself is a closed proceeding, open only to all
proper parties. The intent of the closed hearing is one of pro-
tecting the juvenile from publicity which would result in punish-
ment for the juvenile regardless of the court's final determination.4 1
There has been discussion in recent years concerning the closed
proceeding. A few juvenile judges have adopted policies of pub-
lishing the name of the youthful offender and that of his parents
and hearing the case in open court with press and public freely
admitted.42  The intent of such publicity seems to be one of punish-
ment rather than rehabilitation. Indeed some delinquent young-
sters revel in the publicity and it inspires them to new acts of
delinquency. North Dakota is fortunate in adhering to the closed
juvenile concept.
The hearing itself must extend to the child the privilege against
self-incrimination and he must be afforded the right to confront
all witnesses and to hear their sworn testimony and to cross-ex-
amine them on their testimony. In the past the willingness of
juvenile courts to receive hearsay evidence has resulted in much
criticism from members of the bar. The requirement of the
counsel be present; that he is informed that the state will provide counsel If he is unable
to afford -proper counsel; and that if he does make any statements, they may be used in
court against him. If the accused wishes to waive his rights, such waiver must be made
freely and knowingly and the burden is on the law enforcement officials to see that such
a proper waiver is made. See also Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary Sys-
tern: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wrsc. L. REv. 7.
40. See Lefstein, In re Gault, Juvenile Courts and Lawyers, 53 A.B.A.J. 811, 813, 814
(1967): "Besides important questions pertaining to the nature of adjudication hearings
and the function of counsel, a myriad of other issues must be contemplated in the wake
of Gault. For example, will the exclusionary rule prohibiting the admission of evidence
Illegally seized be extended to juvenile courts? Prior to Gault, in the few eases in which
the issue had been raised, the exclusionary rule was applied. In the post-Gault era, these
rulings are likely to become more common, particularly in view of the conceptual link
between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
Also significant is whether requirements of Miranda v. Arizona should apply-or
already do apply-to police interrogations of juveniles. Technically, the Gault decision
appears not to apply Miranda restrictions, although the opinion's languiage is not free
from doubt and reasonable men may differ. As stated earlier, at one point the court de-
carea that it is not concerned with procedures or constitutional rights applicable to the
prejudicial stages of the Juvenile process. Elsewhere the Court refers to the police as if
they are now charged with responsibility for advising children of their privilege against
self-incrimination.
The right to appellate review and transcript of proceedings were two issues pre-
sented to the Court in Gault on which it did not rule. But these questions, especially how
they affect Juveniles from indigent families, are likely to be raised again. Already the
indigent child's right to a transcript without cost in delinquency proceedings is pending
before at least two state appellate courts."
41. Bee Gels, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 80 RocKy MT. L. Rnv. 101
(1957). See also State v. Cronin, 220 La. 233, 56 So.2d 242 (1951).
42. Bee Heyns, The 'Treat-En-Rough" Boys are Here Again, 31 IED. PROB. 6 (June
1967).
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Gault decision is in accord with dictum in the New York case of
People v. Lewis4 3 in which the court states:
The customary rules of evidence shown by long experience
as essential to getting at truth with reasonable certainty
in civil trials must be adhered to. . . . Hearsay, opinion,
gossip, bias, prejudice, trends of hostile neighborhood feel-
ings, the hopes and fears of social workers, are all sources
of error and have no more place in children's courts than
in any other court."
A complete determination of the particular facts at issue is at
least as important to juveniles as it is to adults.
The United States Supreme Court speaking through Justice
Fortas stated:
We conclude that the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it
is with respect to adults. We appreciate that special prob-
lems may arise with respect to waiver of the privilege by
or on behalf of children, and that there may well be some
difference in technique - but not in principle - depend-
ing upon the age of the child and the presence and com-
petence of parents. The participation of counsel will, of
course, assist the police, juvenile courts and appellate tri-
bunals in administering the privilege. If counsel was not
present for some permissable reason when an admission
was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure
that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that
it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not
the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy,
fright or despair.45
The right to counsel in juvenile court proceedings has been
a subject of discussion in recent years. A court has stated:
[Where the child commits an act, which act if com-
mitted by an adult would constitute a crime, then due pro-
cess in the Juvenile Court requires that the child be advised
that he is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel,
and this is so even though the Juvenile Court in making
dispositions of delinquent children is not a criminal court."
Other judges have denied counsel stating the proceedings do not
determine guilt or innocence, but rather are for the benefit of the
welfare of the child.47
43. 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).
44. Id. at 178, 183 N.E. at 355.
45. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
46. In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D.D.C. 1955).
47. See People v. FMild, 136 Cal. App.2d 741, 289 P.2d 803 (1955).
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The policy in the North Dakota Juvenile Courts seems to be
one of permitting counsel for the juvenile, but not always one of
informing the juvenile of his right to counsel. This duty now be-
comes incumbent upon each juvenile court.4"
Fairness in the treatment process is itself the goal of the ju-
venile and the juvenile court system. This has been a continuing
goal since the inception of the juvenile court in the United States.
This goal of fairness in the treatment process has characterized
the reported juvenile court cases in North Dakota. The late Chief
Justice Burke of the North Dakota Supreme Court in the case of
State v. Myers"9 wrote that, "considerations of expediency, the
satisfaction of public indignation, or example are contrary to the
whole spirit of the juvenile act.15 0
The Juvenile Judges Association have set forth their feelings
regarding the Gault decision and the operation of the Juvenile Court
in the following statement:
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the
case of in the Matter of Gault affirms the standards for
juvenile and family courts developed over many years by
the National Council on Crime and Delinquency and its Coun-
cil of Judges, the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges,
and the United States Children's Bureau. Basically, Gault
reiterates that juvenile and family courts are courts of law,
and not social welfare agencies.
Due process and fair treatment are as necessary in the
juvenile courts as they are in any judicial setting, whether
civil or criminal.
The juvenile court hearing, however, remains a unique
type of judicial proceeding characterized by its treatment-
oriented philosophy and its focus on the individual child.
We do not read the Gault decision as undermining the non-
criminal character of juvenile and family courts, or as abro-
gating their judicial concepts, whose intrinsic soundness
was affirmed by the justices even though they were com-
pelled to view them through the unsympathetic and atypi-
cal lens shaped from the facts of the Gault case. It is the
obligation of all juvenile court judges to incorporate the
mandates of Gault into the juvenile court hearings while
48. See McBride v. Jacobs, 247 F.2d 695, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1957), wherein the court
stated, "The juvenile must be advised that he has a right to engage counsel or to have
counsel named on his behalf, and second, where that right exists, the court must be as-
sured that any waiver of it is intelligent and competent. The latter Implies that where a
waiver is relied on, the Juvenile Court must affirmatively find as a fact that by reason
of 'age, education, and information, and all other pertinent facts' the minor is able to
and did make an intelligent waiver."
49. 74 N.D. 297, 22 N.W.2d 199 (1946). In this case the North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed the decision of a juvenile judge who ordered a boy to the state training school
because of the "deterrent effect which the commitment would have upon juveniles." The
court held that deterrence may well be an objective of criminal court proceedings but is
contrary to the entire rehabilitative spirit of the Juvenile court.
50. Id. at 302. 22 N.W.2d at 201.
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retaining the many basic values of the juvenile court pro-
cess.
Implicit in this decision must be a recognition that
juvenile courts are completely dependent on public support,
which too often in the past has not been forthcoming.
New legislation may be needed in many states, not only to
correlate existing statutes with the Gault ruling, but to pro-
vide the budgetary support that can make the words "indi-
vidualized justice" a reality.
We urge judges, the courts, the organized bar, legis-
latures, and society to join in efforts to meet the require-
ments of the decision. We also urge that every community
endeavor to provide juveniles and the juvenile courts with
more than the bare minimum support and services that
have been provided to date, so that the juvenile courts can
give children the specialized attention they have been prom-
ised.51
The ultimate effect of the Gault decision on the operation of
the Juvenile Court system in North Dakota is not one which does
violence to the operation of the juvenile court within its North Da-
kota framework. It is one of a number of decisions in both federal
and state courts which have forecast changes in the operation of
the juvenile court. The court has not ceased to exist nor have its
functions been drastically changed or diminished. Rather Gault,
like others involving the operation of juvenile courts, is one of
achieving both the due process concept of fundamental fairness
and continuing the traditional parens patriae concept of serving the
best interest of the juvenile. This then must continue to be the
goal and aspiration of the juvenile court.
51. Statement of Council of Judges of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency
on the Case of In the Matter of Gault (as adopted on May 27, 1967), 18 Juv. CT. JUDGED
J. 43 (1967).
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